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Bankrupt Tithers, the Eighth Circuit
& the Supreme Court:
Still Praying for RFRA Relief
from Bankruptcy Law*
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young)'
I. INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) is one of
the most important and controversial congressional acts since Congress drafted
the Free Exercise Clause.2 RFRA greatly increases the likelihood that a free
exercise ofreligion claim will succeed by restoring the compelling governmental
interest test 3 Prior to RFRA, the Supreme Court abandoned this test in
Employment Division v. Smith.4
Until the decision of the Eighth Circuit in the instant case, many were
cautious in predicting just how close RFRA would come to achieving its goal of
increasing religious freedom.' Its success depended largely on the judicial
response to the changes instituted by RFRA.
Due to the pressure President Clinton brought to bear on the Justice
Department in the instant case,6 it withdrew its brief, which denied that RFRA
* The Author would like to thank Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law at the
University of Missouri-Columbia, for his insight and invaluable assistance with this
Note.
1. 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, 117 S. Ct.
2502(1997).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). See infra note 33 for a discussion of the enactment
of RFRA. For a discussion of the importance of RFRA, see Michael S. Paulsen, A RFRA
Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the US. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249 (1995).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
4. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See infra note 111-14 and accompanying text for the
reasons given by the Court for creating a new rule in Smith.
5. See Frederick M. Gedicks, RFRA and the Possibility of Justice, 56 MONT. L.
REV. 95, 117 (1995) (maintaining that as a result of RFRA "there may be reason to hope"
that the Supreme Court will protect religious liberty).
6. The pressure President Clinton exerted on the Justice Department was not done
in isolation. The Clinton Administration did in fact originally support the creditors in
this action, "prompting cries of betrayal from religious groups." Laurie Goodstein,
Religious Groups Fight U.S. In Bankruptcy Case, WASH. POST, May 23, 1994, at Al.
A White House spokesperson claimed that "[b]ecause the code applies to both religious
and nonreligious organizations, we don't think there's an implication for the RFRA:' Id.
President Clinton faced political pressure, as well as religious pressure. Senator
Orrin Hatch took the Senate floor on May 3, 1994, requesting that President Clinton
1
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applied to this bankruptcy case Without the Justice Department's input, the
Eighth Circuit applied RFRA, found it satisfied, and gave RFRA the teeth that
it needed However, questions remain as to how successfully the court applied
RFRA.
Beyond these question regarding the application of RFRA, more immediate
questions as to the constitutionality of RFRA have arisen due to the Supreme
Court's recent decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, which purports to strike
down RFRA as unconstitutional? This Note takes the position that, because the
Supreme Court based its decision upon the 14th Amendment and concepts of
federalism, the Court declared RFRA unconsitutional only as applied to the
States. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit's application of RFRA in the instant case,
essentially a federal bankruptcy case, should remain undisturbed by the Supreme
Court's decision in Boerne.'0
II. FACTS AND HOLDiNG
Bruce and Nancy Young, the debtors in this action, filed a Chapter 7
bankruptcy petition on February 3, 1992." As active church members, they
order the Justice Department to "back off... and allow the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act to have the widespread, broad coverage that we intended here in
Congress in the first place." Id
7. See infra note 33 for a discussion of the actions of President Clinton and the
Justice Department in the instant case.
8. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407,
1417 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. grante4 vacateda and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 1502 (1997).
9. City ofBoemev. Flores, No. 95-2074, 1997 WL 345322 (June 25, 1997), rev'g
73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996).
In Boerne, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling that RFRA was
unconstitutional. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit stated that Congress had the authority
to enact RFRA, and that RFRA did not violate the Establishment Clause, the Separation
of Powers, or the 10th Amendment. Id
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996), and subsequently
reversed the Fifth Circuit. Boerne, 1997 WL 345322, at *16. In a 6-3 decision, the
Supreme Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress'
power under the 14th Amendment to "enforce" constitutional rights against the States.
Id at *7.
10. See American Bankruptcy Institute, Court Strikes Down Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, Supreme Court Bulletin, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (July 1, 1997) [hereinafter
Supreme Court Bulletin].
The question of the constitutionality of RFRA was not raised in the instant case.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari, vacated judgment, and remanded
the instant case to the Eighth Circuit for further consideration consistent with Boerne.
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Church (In re Young), 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
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regularly tithed" funds to Crystal Evangelical Free Church (the Church). 3 Even
though they were insolvent, the debtors persisted in donating $13,450 during the
year leading up to their petition for bankruptcy. 4
The bankruptcy trustee brought an action against the Church to recover the
money the debtors donated to the Church. 5 For the trustee to recover the money,
the court would have to find that the donation was a fraudulent transfer. 6 Both
parties filed a motion for summary judgment.17 The trustee claimed that the tithe
was a fraudulent transfer because the debtors did not receive "reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for" the contributions made to the Church.'" The
Church claimed that value was received in the form of indirect economic
benefits such as: church membership, access to facilities, tax deductions, and
spiritual counseling. 9
The bankruptcy court granted the trustee's summary judgment motion,
denied the Church's motion," and held that "the debtors' contributions to the
church were avoidable transfers." 21 The court reached this holding by applying
I I U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A),2 and found that "the contributions were not"
economically beneficial" to the debtors."
12. Tithing is a practice dating back to the early Jewish religion which has been
adopted by many Christians today. See Lev. 27:1,30,32. Tithing traditionally involves
giving one tenth of household earnings to the Church. Although it is not required by all
religions, members give in obedience to their faith to support the church that they attend.
Id
13. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1410 (1996).
14. Id
15. I
16. Id 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1994) provides in part:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property,
or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or
within one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor
voluntarily or involuntarily ....
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer or obligation; and ....
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or
obligation.
17. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1410.
18. Id
19. IA at 1414.
20. Id at 1410.
21. Id
22. See supra note 16 for the text of the relevant Code provision.
23. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1411. In so holding, the court rejected Ellenberg v.
Chapel Hill Harvester Church, Inc. (In re Moses), 59 B.R. 815, 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
19971 RFRA
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On appeal, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's basic statutory
application, including the finding that the debtors failed to receive reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for their contributions?' However, for the first
time, the Church maintained that application of section 548(a) "would violate the
free exercise and establishment clause of the first amendment."' Exercising its
discretion in consideration of the constitutional arguments,2' the district court
rejected these arguments on several grounds 7 Using the Smith test,' the court
held that the Bankruptcy Code is "a neutral law of general applicability which
has only an incidental effect on religion."
Alternatively, using the pre-Smith test? the court held that the government
had a compelling interest which did not "unfairly discriminate against religious
contributions."'" Finally, the court found that the Bankruptcy Code did not
violate the Establishment Clause as the Code neither advances nor inhibits
religion?2 The Church appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. While
the appeal was pending, the President signed the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act3 into law and the Eighth Circuit invited the United States to intervene?
4
1986) (holding that church services constitute property), and Wilson v. Upreach
Ministries (In re Missionary Baptist Foundation ofAmerica), 24 B.R. 973, 979 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1982) (holding that good will connected with charitable giving constitutes
reasonably equivalent value).
24. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1411.
25. Id
26. Although this issue was raised for the first time on appeal, it can be reviewed
by the court because purely legal issues are involved (and additional evidence and
argument will not change the outcome). Id at 1416 (citing Universal Title Ins. Co. v.
United States, 942 F.2d 1311, 1314-15 (8th Cir. 1991)).
27. Id at 1412.
28. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-82 (1990). The Court held that
even where there is a substantial burden on one's religion, laws which are neutral on their
face and in general application, do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Id
29. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1411-12.
30. Before Smith, the Supreme Court applied a compelling governmental interest
test where a substantial burden on the exercise of religion existed. See Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
31. Id at 1412. The circuit court applied the Smith test. See supra note 28.
32. Id The court applied the entanglement test cited in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971).
33. RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994), was signed by President Clinton on
November 13, 1993. The Eighth Circuit found that certification under 28 U.S.C. §
2403(a) was required due to the fact that the appeal involved questions regarding the
constitutionality of a section of the Bankruptcy Code. As a result, the Eighth Circuit
invited the United States to intervene.
The Justice Department originally took the side of the trustee. However, President
Clinton, in the face of much political and religious pressure, ordered the Attorney
[Vol. 62
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The Eighth Circuit held that even though the donations constituted a
fraudulent transfer, the decision of the lower courts should be reversed?-' In so
holding, the court relied on RFRA and held that allowing the trustee to recover
the donations was not in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and
would substantially burden the Church 6
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Fraudulent Conveyance
England's Statute of XIII Elizabeth37 provides the foundation for modem
fraudulent conveyance law, but the doctrine can be traced back as far as Roman
bankruptcy law?" Twyne's Case,9 providing an early interpretation of the
English statute, found that the transfer of sheep just prior to action by the
debtor's creditors was a fraudulent conveyance as it had the "signs and marks of
fraud."" This concem-with actions bearing the "badges of fraud" has continued
to influence the modem law of fraudulent transfers.4'
General to withdraw her support See Pierre Thomas, Clinton Stops Justice Department
From Seeking Forfeiture of Tithes; Church Contributions ProtectedAgainst Creditors,
President Says, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1994, at A8 (reporting that "[o]n September 14,
1994, Attorney General Janet Reno instructed the Justice Department to withdraw its
brief, which was done half an hour before oral arguments began").
During oral argument, the lawyer for the trustee was understandably unprepared
and when asked for authority for a particular point replied, "Your honor I had hoped to
rely on the United States for case authority and I can't."
The Judge answered, 'They haven't shown up."
The trustee's attorney explained, 'They have run, for reasons unknown."
The Judge responded, "Someone spoke to them from on high."
The trustee's attorney confirmed the judge's response: "That's clearly correct."
See Oliver B. Pollak, "Be Just Before You're Generous": Tithing and Charitable
Contributions in Bankruptcy, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 527, 572 (1996) (quoting tape of
oral arguments before the Eighth Circuit).
34. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1412.
35. Id at 1413.
36. Id at 1416, 1417, 1420.
37. See DANIELR. CowANs, II CowANs BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.9
(1987); Robert J. Bein, Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: Charitable Donations as Fraudulent
Transfers, "100 DICK. L. REv. 103, 107 (1995).
38. See GARRARD GLENN, I FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PRERNCES § 60
(rev. ed. 1940) for an in depth history of fraudulent conveyances.
39. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTs OF BANKRUPTCY 144 (1993).
40. Id
41. See UNIFORMFRAUDULENTTRANSFERACr § 4(b) (1984) [hereinafter UFTA].
19971 RFRA
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The English Bankruptcy Act of 160 42 expanded the definition of a
fraudulent conveyance to include transfers made without valuable
consideration.43 In the subsequent two-hundred years, the law of constructive
fraud developed in such a way that courts presumed all voluntary conveyances
lacking adequate consideration to be fraudulent, rather than delve into the mind
of the debtor." Modem bankruptcy law has embraced this concept by ignoring
the subjective intent of the debtor and focusing instead on the effect of the
debtor's action on the creditor.45
In the United States, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act of 1918
(UFCA) caused transfers for less than fair consideration by insolvent debtors to
be deemed fraudulent.4 As a result, such transfers were considered to be on an
equal level with transfers made with the intent to defraud! 7 However, there was
a good faith component embodied in the definition of fair consideration. '
Therefore, courts were required to look at the nature of the exchange and to
some extent, the intent of the debtor.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978'9 dispensed with the UFCA's good
faith component of fair consideration in an attempt to make more objective the
law concerning fraudulent conveyances. Now, according to section 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code, a trustee may avoid a transfer made in the year prior to
bankruptcy by an insolvent debtor who "receive[d] less than a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange."50 The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA)
of 198511 employs a similar definition of constructive fraud 2
42. GLENN, supra note 38, at § 61e.
43. GLENN, supra note 38, at § 61c.
44. Bein, supra note 37, at 109 n.34-35 (citing Colville v. Parker, CRO. JAC. 158,
79 ENG. REP. 138 (K.B. 1608)); see also Lord Townshend v. Windham, 2 VES. SEN. 1,
28 ENG. REP. 1 (Ch. 1750).
45. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 4 (1918) (cases of constructive
fraud receive similar treatment as cases of actual fraud) [hereinafter UFCA].
46. UFCA §§ 4-7 (1918).
47. Id
48. Id at § 3(a) provides that fair consideration exists "when in exchange for such
property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent therefor, and in good faith, property is
conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied."
49. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548).
50. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1994).
51. UFTA § 5(a) (1985). See BAIRD, supra note 39, at 137 ("The UFTA tracks §
548 of the Bankruptcy Code more closely than does the UFCA.). UFTA is currently the
law of over 20 states. See Robert J. Bein, Robbing Peter To PayPaul: Charitable
Donations As Fraudulent Transfers, 100 DICK. L. REV. 103, 112 n.53 (1995), for a list
of states which have adopted UFTA.
52. See Michael L. Cool & Richard E. Mendales, The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act: An Introductory Critique, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87 (1988).
[Vol. 62
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The issue of defining what constitutes value has been the primary focus of
litigation concerning constructively fraudulent conveyances 3 Neither the
UFTA nor the Bankruptcy Code gives a definition of "reasonably equivalent
value."' However, section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code attempts to define value
as property received or debt satisfied.55 The modem statutes dealing with
constructive fraud 6 tend to regard value from the viewpoint of the creditor in
order to be as objective as possible.5 However, as there is no simple definition
of property, and hence value, parties continue to argue for their own subjective
definition with varying degrees of success 5 '
That courts consider value from the viewpoint of the creditors does not
mean that something must be available for the creditors to claim in satisfaction
of the debt59 InIn re Ottaviano,6" the debtor's wife waived an alimony claim in
exchange for real estate transferred to her by her insolvent ex-husband.6' The
court found that the waiver constituted consideration, thus, the transfer of
property by the debtor was not a fraudulent conveyance.62 In such instances, the
limitations of analyzing value solely from the viewpoint of the creditor become
apparent.
Allardv. Flamingo Hilton (In re Chomakos)3 criticized this narrow analysis
and found that there are certain commercially reasonable, arms-length
53. Michael M. Duclos, A Debtor's Right to Tithe in Bankruptcy Under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, I I BANKR. DEV. J. 665, 678 (1995).
54. See BAIRD, supra note 39, at 148 n.5.
55. Section 548(d)(2)(A) provides that "value means property, or satisfaction or
securing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but does not include an
unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the debtor."
56. UFCA, UFTA and Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.
57. See UFTA § 3 cmt. 2 (1985); Clearwater v. Skyline Constr. Co. 835 P.2d 257,
267 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 848 P.2d 1263 (Wash. 1993) (UFTA); First
Nat'l Bank v. Minnesota Util. Contracting, Inc. (In re Minnesota Util. Contracting), 110
B.R. 414,420 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990) (§ 548).
58. Contrast Pereirav. Checkmate Communications Co. (In re Checkmate Stereo
& Elec., Inc.), 9 B.R. 585 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (where no consideration was given in
return for debtor's transfer, good will is insufficient and transfer is void as a matter of
law), aff'd, 21 B.R. 402 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) with Wilson v. Upreach Ministries (In re
Missionary Baptist Found. of America), 24 B.R. 973, 979 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982) (in
exchange for charitable donations, good will constitutes reasonably equivalent value).
59. Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1995).
60. 63 B.R. 338 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1986).
61. Id. at 339.
62. Id. at 342.
63. Allard v. Flamingo Hilton (In re Chomakos), 170 B.R. 585 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1993), aff'd69 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct 1568 (1996).
1997] RFR,4
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transactions that yield valuable consideration unavailable to a creditor.r4 In
A4llard, the trustee attempted to recover the debtor's gambling losses, claiming
that the debtor did not receive anything of value in exchange.65 However, the
court found that the value received was entertainment for which the debtor paid
a fair price.6 Although it may seem unfair to the creditors, the court reasoned
that ruling differently would place an unreasonable burden on the transferee 7
Outside of commercial transactions, courts view voluntary transfers more
suspiciously, especially where there is a close relationship between the donor
and the donee." When it comes to charitable giving, to show what value the
debtor has actually received is still difficult, even if one does not focus on value
from the viewpoint of the creditor." However, the Supreme Court has held that
"[t]he sine qua non of a charitable donation is a transfer of money or property
without adequate consideration."O7
From the creditor's point of view, a charitable donation may seem little
different from the gambling debt in Allard.7' In both instances, the debtor may
maintain that he received something intangible in return. However, the courts
have chosen to make a distinction:72 entertainment activities possess a
commercial nature-the sense of bargaining for something in exchange for a
benefit 73 -while charitable donations lack this quality.
In the instance of religious donations, courts have rejected the claim that
donations in exchange for sj~iritual benefits constitutes valuable consideration.74
64. Id. at 592.
65. Id. at 587.
66. Id. at 584.
67. Id. at 595. The court found that this was an arms-length transaction in the
ordinary course of the casino's business. Thus "to conclude that [the casino] is liable
in this case would be, in this Court's view, to conclude that each casino and lottery
operator... is in reality a protector of the creditors of its customers, to the point that to
protect themselves they must continuously inquire... [into] the financial circumstances
of each of its patrons .... As a general proposition, that would tip the scales
inordinately in favor of creditors... " Id. at 595-96. See also BFP v. Resolution Trust
Corp. (In re BFP), 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994).
68. See Harris v. Burrell (In re Burrell), 159 B.R. 365 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993)
(transfer between family member in exchange for no consideration is a voidable transfer).
69. See, e.g., Republican Senate-House Dinner Comm. v. Carolina's Pride Seafood,
858 F. Supp. 243,249 (D.D.C. 1994).
70. Unites States v. American Bar Endowment, 447 U.S. 105, 118 (1986).
71. See Bein, supra note 37, at 124.
72. Id
73. Compare Allard v. Flamingo Hilton (In re Chomakos), 69 F.3d 769 (6th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct 1568 (1996), with Carolina's Pride Seafood, 858 F. Supp.
at 249 (D.D.C. 1994) (charitable donation as a fraudulent transfer).
74. Zahra Spiritual Trust v. United States, 910 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1990).
[Vol. 62
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/6
These courts focus on "monetary, not spiritual consideration." 5" Where the
debtor receives more than merely spiritual fulfillment, the issue becomes more
complex.
In Wilson v. Upreach Ministries (In re Missionary Baptist Foundation of
America, Inc.), 6 the debtor, a charitable foundation, gave money to a church,
which the trustee sought to avoid as fraudulent transfers." While agreeing that
there was no tangible consideration or some other monetary equivalent, the court
ruled that the church had given reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
debtor's donations. 8 The court held that section 548(a)(2XA) of the Bankruptcy
Code "does not appear to require that 'reasonably equivalent value' be a
monetary equivalent. '79 Thus, employee morale, good will, and compliance with
the charitable foundation's incorporation mandate could constitute value. 0
In Ellenberg v. Chapel Hill Harvester Church, Inc. (In re Moses),"1 the
debtors made a donation to their church, and the court held that the debtors
received reasonably equivalent value such as personal contacts, counseling, and
utilities during church services.8 2 These services, according to the court,
constitute property received. 3
Ellenberg appears to be an exception as a majority of tithing cases have
held that the debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
contributions." For example, in Morris v. Midway Southern Baptist Church (In
re Newman),5 the trustee sued to recover money tithed to a church by an
insolvent debtor.86 The court found that the debtor did not receive reasonably
equivalent value as there was no tangible economic benefit 7 The court refused
75. Id at 249.
76. Wilson v. Upreach Ministries (In re Missionary Baptist Found. of America),
24 B.R. 973 (Bankr. N.D. Tex 1982).
77. Id at 974-75.
78. Id at 979.
79. Id
80. Id
81. Ellenberg v. Chapel Hill Harvester Church, Inc. (In re Moses), 59 B.R. 815
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986).
82. Id at 818-20.
83. Id at 818.
84. The main reason for this is that there is little connection between paying one's
tithe and being allowed to attend a church service. See In re Packham, 126 B.R. 603, 608
(Bankr. D. Utah 1991); In re Lees, 192 B.R. 756, 758 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1994); Morris
v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239,248 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995);
and In re Tessier, 190 B.R. 396, 399 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995).
85. 183 B.R. 239 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995).
86. Id. at 243.
87. Id. at 247. The court found that the debtors did not receive a property right, a
contract right, or an equitable right to attend the church services. Id
1997] RFRA
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to place a value on the "intangibIe support" offered by the church?8
Furthermore, the court held that any spiritual value received by the debtor was
not given in exchange for the tithes.89 As a result, the court held that the tithes
constituted a fraudulent transfer?0
B. RFRA
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution restricts
governmental interference in religious matters by stating that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof."9' The Free Exercise Clause has been the subject of litigation
almost from its inception. In one of the first cases to address this issue, Reynolds
v,. United States,9 the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit
government regulation of religious practices, even though it does prohibit the
regulation of religious beliefs. 3 The Court maintained this approach until
Sherbertv. Verner."
In Sherbert, the claimant was denied unemployment benefits because she
refused to acceptjobs that would require her to work on her religion's Sabbath
day.95 Sherbert claimed that it was a violation of her free exercise rights to deny
her unemployment benefits.' The Court found that disqualifying her from the
benefits imposed a burden on the free exercise of her religion,7 and that there
was not a "compelling state interest!' in so burdening her?' This was true despite
that the unemployment compensation was a benefit and not a right."
The Court later upheld this view in Wisconsin v. Yoder." In Yoder, a state
law compelled children to attend school until the'age of sixteen.' The plaintiff,
an Amish man, resisted the law, claiming that attendance in school was contrary
88. Id. at 247.
89. Id. at 248. This is due in part to the fact that access to services would not be
denied were the debtor to stop tithing. Id
90. Id
91. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
92. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
93. Id at 166.




98. Id at 406-09.
99. Id at404.
100. 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
101. Id at 207.
[Vol. 62
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to his family's religious beliefs and violated their free exercise of religion.1' 2
The Court agreed that the law burdened the Amish family's free exercise of
religion and the right of Amish parents to control their children's upbringing."0 3
Because this liberty interest was greater than the state's interest in providing
education, the Court struck down the statute. 4
Together, Sherbert and Yoder establish that when government regulation
infringes on the free exercise of religion, there must be a compelling
governmental interest' 05 As a result, "no showing merely of a rational
relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly
sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."'° The use of the compelling
governmental interest test remained unquestioned until Employment Division v.
Smith.07
In Smith, two members ofaNative American church in Oregon were fired
and denied unemployment benefits because they used peyote' in religious
ceremonies."° Oregon law prohibits possession of controlled substances,
including peyote."' The Court departed from the language of Sherbert and
Yoder, holding that even where there is a substantial burden on one's religion,
laws that are neutral on their face and in their general application do not violate
the Free Exercise Clause."'
There are several possible reasons why the Court in Smith departed from the
compelling interest test when dealing with religious expression, such as the fear
of appearing to condone a criminal act."2 The Court expressed its concern that
individuals will use the Free Exercise Clause to avoid laws applicable to the
general population." 3 In addition, the Court wished to avoid having to look into
102. Id at 208-09.
103. Id at281,232-33.
104. Id at236.
105. Id at 215 (only compelling governmental interests "not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion").
106. Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398,406 (1963) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516,530 (1945)).
107. 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
108. Id at 874. Peyote is a hallucinogenic drug.
109. Id
110. Id
I 11. Id at 882-85. For a more in depth analysis of Smith and its effect on
subsequent religious claims, see Steven Hopkins, Is GodA Preferred Creditor? Tithing
AsAn Avoidable Transfer in Chapter 7 Bankruptcies, 62 U. CH. L. REV. 1139 (1995).
112. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
113. Id at 885-86.
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the "centrality" of someone's religious beliefs in order to determine the necessity
of employing the compelling interest test.14
- The Smith Court, however, limited its decision, stating that "where the State
has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that
system to cases of 'religious hardship' without a compelling reason."" 5 The
Bankruptcy Code is one such law which some have argued should fall outside
of the Smith rule, as it contains numerous individual exemptions. " " In cases
since Smith, where facially neutral statutes have had multiple exceptions, the
Court has deemed that the Smith rule is not applicable and has used the
compelling interest test instead."7 Nonetheless, this exception to the Smith rule
was little consolation to those who had relied for years on the compelling
governmental interest test. Thus, in 1993, facing much political and religious
pressure,"" President Clinton signed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act into
law." 9
The purpose of RFRA, is "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth
in [Sherbert and Yoder] and to guarantee its application in all cases where free
exercise of religion is substantially burdened. '1 As a result, RFRA is basically
"a legislative veto of the Supreme Court's decision in Smith."'' The three main
114. Id at 886-87. Thi Court stated "[i]t is no more appropriate for judges to
determine the 'centrality' of religious beliefs before applying a 'compelling interest' test
in the free exercise field.... Judging the centrality of different religious practices is
akin to the unacceptable 'business ofevaluating the relative merits of differing religious
claims." Id (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,263 n. (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
115. Id at 884 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,708 (1986)).
116. See Hopkins, supra note 111, at 1149 n.56 (citingAmici Curiae Brief for
Christian Legal Society, et al. at 6, Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re
Young), 82 F.3d.1407 (D. Minn. 1993)).
117. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993).
118. See supra note 6 for a discussion on the pressure placed on the Clinton
Administration.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994).
121. See Hopkins, supra note 111, at 1151.
[Vol. 62
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/6
elements of RFRA are: 2 (i) a religious act," 3 (ii) a substantial burden,124 and
(iii) a compelling governmental interest.'2
In Morris, 6 a case almost identical to the instant case, the court applied
RFRA after finding that the debtor's tithes to the church represented a fraudulent
transfer.127 The court found that the trustee could recover, as there was not a
substantial burden on the debtors' exercise of religion and the government had
a compelling interest' In reaching its decision regarding the substantial
burden, the court noted that the debtor was not prevented from tithing based on
section 548(a), the debtor had already tithed when this action commenced, and
122. RFRA § 2000bb-1 provides that:
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as
provided in subsection (b).
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if
it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
123. To qualify, an act must be the result of a sincerely held religious belief.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-19. See Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas,
Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 229-35 (1994)
(discussing what has historically been regarded as an act of religious expression).
124. To meet this element, government action "must significantly inhibit or
constrain conduct or expression that manifests some central tenet of a [person's]
individual [religious] beliefs; must meaningfully curtail a [person's] ability to express
adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a [person] reasonable opportunities to engage
in those activities that are fundamental to a [person's] religion." Werner v. McCotter, 49
F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2625 (1995). See Sasnett v.
Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429, 1440-45 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (discussion of substantial
burden).
125. Post-Smith, "compelling governmental interests" has been interpreted to mean
"interests of the highest order." Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215
(1972)). Cases applying RFRA have held the following interests compelling:
enforcement of the Social Security system, Droz v. Commissioner, 48 F.3d 1120, 1122-
23 (9th Cir. 1995); the safety of prisons, Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1554 (8th
Cir. 1996); and the safety of schools, Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 885 (9th Cir.
1995). For further discussion of what constitutes a compelling interest, see Laycock,
supra note 123, at 222-28. See also Paulsen, supra note 2.
126. 183 B.R. 239 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995).
127. Id. at 250-51.
128. Id. at 251-52.
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the debtor would more than likely continue to tithe in the future.129
Alternatively, the court held that the government had a compelling interest in
protecting the administration of the Bankruptcy Code as a whole.3 0 In In re
Tessier,'3' the debtor contested the court's refusal to approve its plan for
reorganization. 132 The court refused to approve the plan because it included
amounts set aside for tithing, which the court found were not reasonable living
expenses. 3 In applying RFRA, the court held that not allowing debtors money
to tithe is a substantial burden on their religious expression." In addition, the
court, defining "compelling governmental interests"as interests "of the highest
order," found that the trustee failed to meet this standard. 135 However, the court
then analyzed RFRA and found that it was unconstitutional in that it violated the
Separation of Powers.3
Finally, in Flores v. City ofBoerne,137 the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court's ruling that RFRA was unconstitutional. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit
held that Congress had the authority, under the 14th Amendment, to enact
RFRA, and that RFRA did not violate the Establishment Clause, Separation of
Powers, or the 10th Amendment 1 38
The Supreme Court granted certiorari' 39 and, in turn, reversed the Fifth
Circuit' 4 In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that RFRA was
unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress' power under the 14th
Amendment to "enforce" constitutional rights against the States. 41
However, due to the fact that the Boerne Court based its decision upon the
14th Amendment and concepts of federalism, RFRA may remain constitutional
129. Id. at251.
130. Id. at 252. The court states that "[t]he compelling nature of the interest is
reflected in the fact that recovery of fraudulent transfers has been a basic tenet of
bankruptcy law for 400 years." Id.
131. 190 B.R. 396 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995).
132. Id. at 397-98.
133. Id. at 403.
134. Id. at 398.
135. Id. at 405.
136. Id. at 406-07.
137. Flores v. City ofBoeine, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, No. 95-2074,
1997 WL 345322 (June 25, 1997).
138. Id at 1364.
139. Flores v. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996).
140. City ofBoeme v. Flores, No. 95-2074, 1997 WL 345322, at *16 (June 25,
1997), rev'g73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996).
141. Boerne, 1997 WL 345322, at *7. Members of Congress have expressed
disappointment in the Supreme Court's decision in Boerne, and immediately announced
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in its application to federal, as opposed to state, law. Therefore, the Eighth
Circuit's application of RFRA in the instant federal bankruptcy case should
remain undisturbed by the Boerne decision. 142
Nonetheless, and despite that the question of the constitutionality of RFRA
was not raised in the instant case, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari,
vacatedjudgment and remanded the instant case to the Eighth Circuit for further
consideration consistent with Boerne.143 The Eighth Circuit's decision on
remand is awaited.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals began by discussing fraudulent transfers under 11
U.S.C. § 548(aX2). The court stated that the term "fraudulent transfers" may be
better replaced by the term "avoidable transfers" because the statute does not
require fraudulent intent for a transfer to be voidable.'" The court considered
the elements necessary to find a transaction fraudulent,'41 stipulating that the
only element in dispute in this case was the question of reasonably equivalent
value. 46
In the discussion of value, the court outlined the district court's holding that
the debtor did not receive any value and that no exchange took place. 47 Next,
the court explored the Church's argument that the definition of value included
indirect economic benefits. 4 ' The court agreed that value can include intangible
142. See Supreme Court Bulletin, supra note 10 ("Although Boerne appears to
conflict with Christians, note that the decision was based on Congress' power under...
the 14th Amendment. Since Congress did not need to rely on the 14th Amendment to
apply RFRA to federal laws, the Act's application in bankruptcy cases may remain an
open question.").
143. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 117 S. Ct. 2502
(1997), granting cert., vacating, and remanding 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996).
144. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1414. The court is responding to the assertion by the
Church that, as drafted, the Code section applies to actual fraud.
145. For a trustee to avoid a transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1994), she must
"prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) there was a transfer of an interest of
the debtor in property, (2) the transfer was made within one year before the date of the
filing of the petition, (3) the debtor was insolvent on the date the transfer was made, and
(4) the debtor received less than a reasonable equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer." Id.
146. Christians, 82 F.3d at 414.
147. Id
148. Id The church maintained that as "value" includes indirect economic
benefits, the debtors received "value" in the form of "tax deductions for charitable
contributions, church membership and spiritual counseling, and, more concretely, access
1997] RFRA
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property, but found that the district court correctly analyzed the transaction,
measured the value received, and reached the correct result.149 Thus, the court
held that the debtors did not receive value.'"
In dealing with whether there. had been an exchange, the court stated that,
even if the debtors had received value, there still must be a quid pro quo
exchange ofvalue.'5 ' The court reviewed the facts surrounding the transfers and
found that there was not a true exchange because the Church services were free
and were not provided soley in exchange for the debtor's contributions 525 Thus,
the transfers were voidable.15
3
The court then turned to the Church's free exercise of religion argument.114
However, the court stated that, because the Church would succeed under RFRA,
there was no need to discuss the merits of the Church's constitutional claim.'5
The court also noted that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
reviewing the constitutional issue. 6
The court stated that RFRA applies retroactively 57 and then turned to the
issue of whether requiring the Church to return the tithed money would "unfairly
discriminate against religion."' 58 The court detailed the Church's arguments, but
declined to apply the Smith test because RFRA is more protective.15 9 Instead, the
court stated that RFRA restores the compelling governmental interest test."
The first part of the RFRA test examined by the court was the "substantial
burden" requirement.' The court surveyed various cases for a more detailed
definition of "substantial burden."' 62 It then looked at the practice of tithing and
to church facilities because contributions from the debtors and others help pay for the
Church's operating expenses." Id.
149. Id. at 1415.
150. Id. The court relied on Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman),
183 B.R. 239, 247 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995) (by tithing, a debtor does not receive an
enforceable property, contract, or equitable right to be involved in church services).
151. Christians, 82F.3d at 1415.
152. Id.





158. Id. at 1417. See supra notes 28-31, 111-17 and accompanying text.
159. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1417.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1418. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
162. Id. For a definition of substantial burden, the court relied on Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,215-19 (1972), and Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2625 (1995).
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how it would be effected by allowing the government to recover. 163 The court
noted the arguments in support of the government, but found them insignificant,
holding that "it is sufficient that the governmental action in question
meaningfully curtails, albeit retroactively, a religious practice."'" Thus, the
court held that the burden was substantial in this case. 65
The next issue examined by the court was whether a compelling
governmental interest existed." The court surveyed pre-Smith case law to find
a better definition of "compelling."'6 7 It then compared the interests of the
government and the policy issues raised by the trustee to other compelling
interests.' 6 The court agreed with prior cases stating that bankruptcy interests
are not compelling under RFRA.'69 Thus, the court did not get to the issue of
least restrictive means because it held that the government's interest in protecting
creditors in the instant case was not compelling. 170
The dissenting judge agreed with the majority that the debtors did not
receive reasonably equivalent value, but disagreed with the majority's
application of RFRA.'7 ' The dissent looked at the practice of tithing, the fact
that it was not required or restrained during the year of insolvency, and
concluded that the practice would not be substantially burdened.' 2 Furthermore,
the dissent maintained that the government's interest was compelling and that
section 548(aX2) employed the least restrictive means."7 Therefore, the dissent
would have held that the trustee satisfied the governmental exception in the
RFRA test and that the district court should have been aff'rmed. 74
163. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1418-19. The court contrasted Morris v. Midway
Southern Bapfist Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995), with In
re Tessier, 190 B.R. 396 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995).
164. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1418.
165. Id
166. Id at 1419.
167. Id The court reviewed Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989); UnitedStates v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1982); Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437 (1971); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); and Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963).
168. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1419-20.
169. Id at 1420.
170. Id The court agreed with the Tessier decision which held that the government
did not have a compelling government interest in enforcing the Bankruptcy Code over
the interests of the debtors. Id
171. Id at 1421.
172. Id at 1421-22.
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V. COMMENT
The fraudulent conveyance issue is one which will face the least resistance
from other courts. Although there are cases which state that goodwill and other
such intangibles constitute value, 75 most courts find otherwise,176 or at least have
required a proper exchange to have taken place. The court's analysis of value
in the instant case'n reveals a willingness to look at value from more than just
the creditor's viewpoint.7 8
However, even assuming that the debtors received reasonably equivalent
value, there must be an exchange. Where there is no exchange, a detailed
analysis of value is unnecessary. This exchange element is important, not just
because the Bankruptcy Code requires it,7 9 but because it makes a transaction
seem more commercial and less like a gif'L" To make an exception for debtors
giving to a church is to depart from hundreds of years of statutory law.' The
law of fraudulent conveyances was enacted to protect creditors, and it cannot be
said that just because the debtor happens to be giving to a church, the creditor
deserves less protection.
Despite this, some courts have declined to classify tithes as fraudulent
conveyances. In Ellenberg,"8 the court held that the services received had a
value which could be ascertained." 3 However, in so finding the court ignored
the exchange element. One way in which Ellenberg can be distinguished from
the instant case is that, in Ellenberg, the church "required the contributions as a
condition of the debtor's employment as a deacon." I" There was no such
requirement present in Christians.'
In the instant case, as well as Morris,"' the court reached a more reasonable
result by including the 'in exchange for' element in its analysis. As the court
failed to find the element of exchange, the court was justified in holding that the
175. See supra notes 58-80 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 58, 84-90 and accompanying text.
177. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1415.
178. See supra notes 44-48, 56-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of
viewpoints regarding the process of assessing value.
179. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1994).
180. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text.
182. 59 B.R. 815, 818 (Bankr.N.D. Ga. 1986).
183. Ellenberg v. Chapel Hill Harvester Church, Inc. (In re Moses), 59 B.R. 815
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986).
184. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407,
1411 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Ellenberg, 59 B.R. at 950.).
185. Id.
186. 183 B.R. 239 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995).
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tithes constituted fraudulent transfers. One could conclude that this should be
the end of the trustee's case because fraudulent transfers are voidable under law
as it has existed for hundreds of years.1 7 However, the issue is not as simple as
this because the Free Exercise Clause is just as deeply rooted in the history of the
United States.
The Free Exercise Clause has, as a matter of course, been expanded and
retracted as the Supreme Court has confronted the issues surrounding the
practice of religion. The movement of the Court away from the compelling
governmental interest test to the less restrictive Smith test was perceived by some
as a blatant encroachment on the Church's ever-decreasing freedom."' Thus,
RFRA was enacted in an attempt to restore churches to their position prior to
Smith.8 9 However, questions exist regarding RFRA's application and
constitutionality."'°
Embedded in RFRA are political and religious concerns which highlight
the delicate balance between the church and the state, as well as the various
branches of government. In this instance, religious groups put pressure on
President Clinton and Congress, which in turn affected the Eighth Circuit's
decision. Senator Orrin G. Hatch argued that, had the President not directed the
Justice Department to withdraw its brief from the Eighth Circuit's consideration,
the result in the instant case "would have largely gutted the Act of its protections
for religious Americans."' 9 The Senator added "[i]t should not have taken the
President's own last-minute intervention to save [RFRA] from being gutted by
his own Administration." 2 This indicates, at least to some extent, that the
President had an effect on the outcome of Christians. Indeed, the absence of the
Justice Department at such short notice was duly noted by the Eighth Circuit."9
The court's analysis of RFRA in the instant case, while not surprising given
the external pressure on the court, is open to criticism. The court assumed that
the practice of tithing is truly a religious exercise. Although tithing may be
relatively easy to document as a valid religious activity, only the debtor knows
his intent at the time of the tithe. Thus, there will always be significant room for
error in this subjective area. In addition, as tithing normally involves the giving
187. See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text.
188. See Troy S. Anderson, Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re
Young): Why Would "Christians" Take Money Out Of the Church Offering Plate?
4 REGNT U. L. REv. 177 (1994).
189. See Laycock, supra note 123, at 213-14 (discussing the need for RFRA).
190. The issue of RFRA's constitutionality in relation to federal law appears to be
undecided. See supra notes 9, 137-143 and accompanying text.
191. Prepared statement ofSenator Orrin 0. Hatch, Fed. News Serv. Cong. Hearing
Testimonies, 1995 WL 10888441 (Oct. 25, 1995).
192. Id.
193. See supra note 33.
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often percent of one's income, questions arise regarding what a court is to do in
the event a debtor tithes twenty or thirty percent. May the trustee claim the
surplus to be beyond the protected religious practice of tithing? This question
remains unanswered.
Unfortunately, no definition of "substantial burden" is provided in RFRA.
In Sherbert)4 the court stated that "the pressure upon [the plaintiff] to forego
that practice is unmistakable." 95 Following this definition of substantial burden,
courts have split on whether section 548 places a substantial burden on
debtors. 96 Understandably, the burden on churches is great, but many courts
have chosen to focus on the effect of the law on the individual debtor alone.'
In the instant case, the court gave a variety of definitions of substantial
burden and ultimately held that the test was met because allowing the
government to recover "would effectively prevent the debtors from tithing, at
least for the year immediately preceding' filing for bankruptcy.'9 However, this
is not clearly the case. As the dissent pointed out, the debtors had already tithed
during that year, and thus, were not prevented from doing so. Furthermore,
recovery by the trustee does not take away from the debtors' practice of
tithing. 9' In addition, assuming they do not become bankrupt in the future,
section 548 does not prohibit debtors frofii continuing to tithe.0
The majority, dismissing the dissent's argument, stated that "it is sufficient
that the governmental action in question meaningfully curtails, albeit
retroactively, a religious practice of more than minimal significance in a way that
is not merely incidental. '20 Vague language such as this is a significant reason
behind the continued split in the courts. Furthermore, instead of focusing solely
on the burden placed on the individual debtor, the court should have expanded
its focus to include the burden placed on the church itself That this was the
194. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
195. Id. at 403.
196. Contrast In re Tessier, 190 B.R. 396 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995) (finding a
substantial burden on the debtor), with Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re
Newman), 183 B.R. 239 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995).
197. See supra note 196.
198. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407,
1418 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. grantec4 vacated, and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
199. Id at 1421-22.
200. Id at 1422.
201. Id at 1418-19.
202. The individual rights contemplated by RFRA are not just the rights ofa single
individual. Instead, these rights encompass the associational rights of a church or other
religious group where such an association has "organizational standing" to assert a right
on behalf of its collective membership under the three-part test set out in Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 103-04 (2d ed: 1994).
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intent of the Eighth Circuit is possible. However, to avoid misinterpretation, the
Eighth Circuit should have stated its reasoning more clearly.
The issue of a compelling governmental interest has also created a split in
the courts.2 °3 Once again RFRA does not define "compelling governmental
interest," nor does case law provide much help.2°t The court in the instant case
used the definition, "interests of the highest order.""5  Despite the split in
authority, however, the court held that the government's interest in protecting
creditors was not compelling.
The court also compared Tessier"°- and Morris, 7 ultimately siding with
Tessier as it held that there was a substantial burden with no compelling
governmental interest. However, there are important differences in Tessier
which the court in the instant case failed to address. Tessier is a Chapter 13,
rather than a Chapter 7, bankruptcy case. This makes a critical difference
because the debtors in Tessier were not allowed to set aside money with which
to tithe. The Tessier court correctly held that this was a substantial burden
because the debtors were effectively prevented from tithing. In the instant case,
as in Morris, the debtors were not prevented from tithing; they had already tithed
and could continue to do soFt However, had the court noted that the Church's
burden, not just that of the individual debtor, was a primary focus, this
distinction between Tessier and Morris would not be as significant.2
The issue of a compelling governmental interest would not be reached were
the court to fail to find a substantial burden. However, this court did reach the
issue of compelling governmental interest and found, consistent with Tessier,
that the government did not have a compelling interest in protecting the rights
of creditors.2t0 Certainly, while there is a valid interest in voiding fraudulent
203. Christians, 82 F.3d at 1419.
204. See supra notes 122, 125 and accompanying text.
205. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407,
1419 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
206. 190 B.R. 396 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995).
207. 183 B.R. 239 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995).
208. Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1995) (facts are most similar to that of the instant case and the court held that
there was not a substantial burden on the debtor's exercise of religion).
209. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
210. It is of interest that Tessier, after applying RFRA and finding the debtor to
have satisfied the test, ruled that RFRA is unconstitutional. This fact is glossed over by
the instant court, which chooses to ignore the implications. It is possible that the court
in Tessier was less rigorous in applying RFRA because they considered it to be
unconstitutional. As a result, regardless of how they applied the test, they knew that they
were going to find for the trustee.
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transfers, as evidenced by hundreds of years of case law, this interest is not
necessarily an interest ofthe highest order.211
Furthermore, in light of the Boerne decision, the future of Christians may
be in doubt. 2 12 However, as Boerne found that Congress had exceeded its power
under the 14th Amendment, RFRA likely remains good law as applied to federal
law.P This means that plaintiffs challenging federal law may continue to rely
on RFRA for additional protection of their religious rights. 14 Thus, when
Christians is reheard by the Eigth Circuit on remand from the Supreme Court,
its initial decision may very well remain intact.
RFRA's likely survival as applied to federal law means that concerns
regarding RFRA expressed in the past remain valid concerns.21S One immediate
concern with RFRA is that it will open the door to multiple claims of obscure
religious practices which are nearly impossible to verify. This concern was
voiced in Smith.l 6 Even in the case of tithing, we do not necessarily know the
debtor's intent and sincerity of practice. To avoid being misled, the court may
need to hear testimony from the debtor, view the consistency of his past giving,
and evaluate the position of the religious institution to which the debtor tithed.217
Another related concern is that RFRA will be used to avoid responsibility,
providing a way around the law. Already free exercise claims brought under
RFRA are prevalent in prisons. Inmates claim all manner of religious practices
as fundamental to their faith. While many of these claims fail because the
government has a compelling interest in prison security, the claims at the very
least waste taxpayers' money.28
Senator Hatch maintains that "if the bankruptcy code trumps the First
Amendment guarantees protected by [RFRA], then there is not much
government action that would not do so. ''219 However, the more government
action that RFRA trumps, the less accountability there is to the law. Free
exercise of religion is a vital part of the separation of the Church and State, but
211. However, the court in Morris held that the government does have a
compelling interest in enforcing the Bankruptcy Code. Morris v. Midway S. Baptist
Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995).
212. See supra note 9, 137-43 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 142-43 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 122.
215. See Laycock, supra note 123, at 236-43 (concerns raised include effect on
abortion law and tax exempt status of religious institutions).
216. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
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there must be limits placed on the free exercise of religion, lest every law breaker
form a religion of his own.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Christians, the analysis by the Eighth Circuit in relation to the fraudulent
transfer issue seems logical and well supported. However, the court's analysis
of RFRA and its application to the current case is open to criticism. Although
the court likely reached the correct result under RFRA, there are several steps
missing in its analysis which may lead to future abuse. In particular, the court
failed to expand upon the Church's organizational standing to raise a claim
where the substantial burden complained of is not on an individual so much as
on the collective church. Furthermore, the court's application of RFRA is
disturbing in that the court chose to follow Tessier's reasoning while ignoring
the existence of significant distinctions.
By missing steps in its analysis and failing to make important distinctions,
the Eighth Circuit, in its decision of the instant case, may cause subsequent
courts to misapply RFRA. Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit's analysis in
Christians likely will remain intact upon remand from the Supreme Court for
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